When we speak of redundancy in the diving world, we are typically referring to redundant gas supplies, backup lights, a spare mask, or any other piece of equipment that will keep us alive underwater if our primary system fails.

In the military environment, however, redundancy carries a broader and more deliberate meaning. It is rooted in systems engineering and is foundational to ensuring mission success in high-risk or adversarial conditions. Redundancy in this context is not simply about survival — it is about eliminating single-point failures across the entire mission architecture (Avizienis et al., 2004).

The distinction is one of scope.

When survival is the only metric, equipment redundancy may be sufficient. When mission success is the metric, we must widen the aperture. We must evaluate the entire mission as an integrated system composed of hardware, planning processes, command structures, and human decision-makers.

In certain operations, failure is not an acceptable alternative. If that is the case, then redundancy must be built into the system deliberately and comprehensively.

Systems Thinking in Special Operations Diving

Special operations forces operate in environments characterized by decentralized execution, degraded communications, and high autonomy. In such environments, resilience requires more than spare equipment.

There must be redundant pathways in decision-making.

Teams must be capable of selecting among multiple operational options to maintain tempo even when communications degrade or situational awareness narrows (Alberts et al., 2001). They must continue forward in the face of equipment failure, environmental change, or unexpected opposition.

Equipment redundancy remains important.
But equipment alone does not create resilience.

Resilience also depends on the skills, adaptability, and decision-making capacity of individual operators.

This integration of technical systems and human performance is best understood by examining three areas in current subsea combat operations:

1. Dive training methodologies
2. Diver propulsion vehicle (DPV) employment
3. Oxygen rebreather integration

Dive Training and Systems Resilience

Archetype Undersea teaches resilience through structured, hands-on problem solving in the
subsea environment.

This begins with foundational skills.

Buoyancy, trim, propulsion, and mobility are not introductory skills to be quickly checked off. They are the necessary building blocks for operational dominance in complex underwater tasks such as long-range navigation, payload transport, and coordinated maneuver.

A strong foundation is both necessary and sufficient for higher-order performance.

For the past two decades, subsea combat capabilities have not received the same sustained focus as other operational domains. Meanwhile, civilian technical diving has continued to advance in planning methodologies, equipment configuration, and training protocols.

To regain and maintain subsea dominance, we must be willing to leverage that accumulated
knowledge.

Modern dive instruction emphasizes neutral buoyancy and controlled movement rather than simply speed and effort. Control reduces task loading. Reduced task loading increases available cognitive bandwidth. Increased bandwidth enhances resilience.

Our operators are already adaptive and capable decision-makers. The task is to provide them with the knowledge frameworks and training structures that allow those skills to transfer effectively into the subsea environment.

Diver Propulsion Vehicles and System Design

Diver Propulsion Vehicles extend operational reach, reduce fatigue, and expand insertion options. Modern systems can exceed ten miles in range and significantly enhance payload capacity.

However, how we design the mobility system determines whether resilience is increased or compromised.

A predominate approach we see employed across military units is to utilize two DPV tubes attached to a larger frame to increase thrust and towing capacity. While this may appear to increase redundancy, in practice it introduces new single-point vulnerabilities.

These larger two-tube platforms are:

• Heavy and bulky
• Logistically complex to launch and recover
• Difficult to cache
• Dependent on both propulsion units remaining functional

If one tube fails, the system becomes non-viable.

This highlights an important systems principle: redundancy must be evaluated at the system level, not at the component level.

Using two propulsion units on a single integrated platform does not necessarily create resilience if the overall platform cannot function independently when one unit fails.

Archetype’s approach emphasizes individual, high-performance single-tube DPVs for each diver, with additional independent units towed as needed. This architecture increases maneuverability, modularity, and true operational redundancy.

Resilience is not simply about adding more power. It is about preserving function under degraded conditions.

Oxygen Rebreathers and Operational Gas Planning

Archetype Undersea approaches gas as an operational resource rather than merely a life-support requirement.

Operational Gas Planning integrates breathing gas management with mission intent, depth, duration, mobility, task loading, contingency planning, and command decision-making.

Gas determines:

• Reach
• Time on target
• Contingency options
• Decision space

Poor gas planning creates fragile operations.
Disciplined gas planning creates flexibility.

Oxygen rebreathers such as the Mk25/LAR-V provide extended duration and stealth in shallow water operations. However, when employed as a standalone system without layered contingency planning, they represent a single point of failure.

In many land and air systems, such single-point dependency would not be acceptable. Yet in subsea operations, long-standing practice has allowed it to persist.
Modern technical divers operating in non-mission-critical contexts routinely employ redundant life support configurations. It is reasonable to question whether subsea combat operations should accept less resilience than recreational environments.

Archetype Undersea introduces equipment configurations and planning methodologies that:

• Backstop rebreather failure
• Expand depth and duration capability
• Increase mission flexibility
• Provide additional operational margin

Resilience in this context is not excess. It is design.

Conclusion

At Archetype Undersea, we teach resilience as a systems property — not merely as the presence of spare components.

True redundancy requires evaluation against mission context (Knight & Leveson, 1986). Additional hardware alone is insufficient if it does not meaningfully increase survivability or mission continuity under failure conditions.

Our approach widens the aperture.

We consider not only equipment failures, but planning assumptions, human performance limits, command autonomy, and operational contingencies.

Redundancy and resilience are well-established principles in ground and air combat domains. They deserve the same rigor in subsea combat operations.

Archetype Undersea intends to apply that rigor — and to equip our operators with the tools, knowledge, and decision space necessary to succeed.